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A CONVERSATION WITHOUT END:  HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW IN PERSPECTIVE? 
Colin Harvey*
INTRODUCTION 
 
This essay is an extended reflection on the present condition of human 
rights law.  Its origins rest in a class I taught at Fordham Law School in 
April 2011, and the structure of the essay follows the direction travelled in 
that class.  The title also derives from a book series I edit with Hart 
Publishing in Oxford.  The class and the book series have prompted me to 
consider what it might mean to think about rights in perspective.  Res 
Gestae offers a welcome opportunity to “think out loud” about the subject. 
Human rights law holds out the prospect of a transformed world, with a 
language and practice that promises much.  It is a subject that cannot avoid 
reimagining political, legal, and social relations at the local and global 
levels.  The law of human rights is woven through with aspiration and hope.  
Even in legal study, where so much time is spent exploring the standards 
and their interpretation, human rights discourse comes magnificently 
cloaked in the idealism of popular struggles through history, continues to 
pose the question of fulfillment, and encourages expectations of radical 
change. 
Human rights law presents particular challenges for scholarship, and it is 
one aim of this essay to indicate what they might be.  Rather than recite the 
established legal standards, the essay is intended to be read in the spirit of a 
tentative intervention and thus stimulate further discussion.  The 
underpinning assumption is, however, that human rights law is about more 
than the steady accumulation of legal doctrine.  The critical intent of human 
rights law can be lost within the discourse of law, where it becomes easy for 
established ideas to absorb and neutralize new thought and practice.  The 
concern expressed in this essay is how a discourse which holds out the 
vision of human emancipation can be so readily deployed for other ends, or 
simply crushed under the dead weight of established orthodoxies.  How do 
we see human rights law in perspective and retain the enthusiasm, energy, 
and practical engagement that flow from popular struggles for rights over 
time? 
This essay will start with thoughts on history, theory, and context.  It will 
then proceed to look at the selected themes of refugees, socioeconomic 
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rights, national human rights institutions, and bills of rights.  The ambition 
is to suggest that in perspective primarily means resisting legal and political 
closure, thus keeping the conversation about rights going. 
I.  IN PERSPECTIVE?  HISTORY, THEORY, AND CONTEXT 
The title begs obvious questions.  What does human rights law in 
perspective mean?  The human rights law component seems straightforward 
enough, but what is meant by in perspective?  My dictionary says “correctly 
regarded in terms of relative importance.”1
The dilemma when faced with human rights law is that the discourse can 
sound foundational in some basic senses.  It often appears in popular 
imagination as the granite-faced representative of absolutist thinking.  The 
bringing of perspective to human rights can therefore sound like an attempt 
to relativize it out of existence.  Surely human rights are foundational, 
universal and binding, both morally and legally?  The argument advanced 
here is not intended to impede the implementation of existing standards, or 
to prevent the emergence of new ones.  It is to suggest that if we are to 
nourish the resources that might keep human rights law alive we must 
understand both why the normative standards emerged as well as the global 
and local societal contexts in which they now function.  We are likely to do 
a disservice to human rights if we do not advance this questioning mindset 
and keep alive the resources that energize a global movement. 
  The sense is of seeing an object 
“correctly” within its surrounding context.  The implication is one of a 
relationship to other things; we view something in perspective when we see 
it as part of a larger picture.  The object is there, but it is not the only or 
most important thing.  This is not the same as the popular meaning of the 
term.  Sometimes in perspective is taken to imply a negative, that human 
rights are somehow lessened or devalued.  In this meaning, placing human 
rights law in perspective is essentially about diluting the normative power 
of the discourse.  That is not the argument here.  To view anything “in 
perspective” is not to erode its intrinsic integrity, but to accept its relational 
nature. 
The history of human rights can circle around start dates.  Should we 
trace the origins of rights as far back as we can credibly go?  The purpose of 
such extended historical work is often to demonstrate that human rights are 
genuinely universal and shared across all cultures and traditions.  If at times 
this stretches belief, the aim is a commendable one:  to show that we have 
always somehow known (and explicitly recognized via ancient texts and 
practices) that each human person has entitlements by the simple virtue of 
their humanity.  The challenge to this line of thinking is that human rights, 
as we understand them today, look like newer arrivals.  The historical 
record suggests that human beings have an inconvenient habit of according 
primacy to status over express recognition of a common humanity.  In the 
concentric circles of life and human belonging, the “stranger” can often 
appear a long way from the core of rights, entitlements, and duties. 
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2011] A CONVERSATION WITHOUT END 3 
There are at least two strands to recent history that seem promising as a 
beginning.  The first looks to seventeenth century England, and then to 
eighteenth century France and the emerging United States.  This view 
locates human rights in the rise of the constitutional state.  Rights therefore 
emerge from discussions of how new constitutional spaces will be created 
that recognize and capture the purpose of democratic government.  The 
difficulty with this line of thought is that these were often 
national/nationalist debates that were principally concerned with the rights 
and duties of citizenship.2
Those searching for beginnings may find more fertile ground in the post-
1945 explosion of human rights standard setting and institution building, 
anchored around the United Nations.  Revolutionary developments have 
taken place in the international legal order.  The transition from a state-
based system of regulation to one that recognizes and formally 
acknowledges the existence of human rights is well-trodden ground.  It 
stands as an impressive achievement, even if the challenges of 
implementation are a persistent practical reality.  This does seem a more 
likely candidate for the birthplace of a fully-fledged human rights culture.  
Whatever view is taken of when precisely this modern human rights 
movement gained political traction, it is hard to argue that there was not 
something distinctive about the post-1945 human rights movement, in terms 
of its more expansive embrace of the idea of rights and, to an extent, also 
the rise of more sophisticated understandings of how rights might operate 
globally.  Even if this new normative imagination did not take hold until 
later, it seems like a good place to commence the international legal and 
institutional story. 
  In the English context, the Bill of Rights of 1689 
evolved from internal political struggles over the balance of power between 
rival institutions, and in France again the context is largely one of internal 
citizenship struggles and constitutional contestation.  The U.S. 
constitutional journey started in an anti-colonial context, with a battle for 
independence, and then the desire to bring together, in a coherent way, a 
new state.  The birth of constitutional rights is in these discussions, but 
whether they are accurately described as part of the emergence of the 
human rights movement, or as the constitutional vindication of human 
rights, is an open question.  The self-determination struggles that have 
followed (including recent developments across the Middle East) do 
continue the pattern of a global conversation about citizenship and its 
meaning, but again, are they to be classified as a human rights dynamic 
waiting to happen, or the victory of human rights discourse?  Are they 
instead principally concerned with national renewal or self-assertion, or are 
they about a complex blend of the national, regional, and global in a world 
where technological innovation is rendering borders meaningless? 
To many observers, the history of how we got here is of less interest than 
the fact of arrival.  Historical analysis may have relevance to understanding 
what people intended by their actions, but to lawyers this can often appear 
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the only significant practical relevance.  This is, in my view, a mistake.  
When approaching the language and practice of human rights, 
understanding historical moments assists in grasping what makes an 
advance possible in concrete context.  Lessons may or may not exist, but 
knowing this remains a more than purely doctrinal interest.  The human 
rights movement is prone to forget its own origins in popular struggles and 
in movements that sought transformational change both locally and 
globally.  The energetic attempt to suppress these inconvenient memories—
to ensure institutional and doctrinal stability—does not keep with human 
rights law in perspective. 
The theoretical context is potentially vast and can involve all the key 
conceptual debates of law, constitutionalism, and democracy.  It is here that 
perspective becomes so significant.  The idea underpinning human rights 
law in perspective is precisely that rights are conceptually relational.  In 
other words, rights are embedded in societal contexts.  Whether these 
contexts are understood as intrinsic to persons—or even communal 
entities—they carry with them social implications and consequences.  The 
claim to possess a right, particularly a human right, is a species claim.  It is 
to argue that human beings have these rights.  Even if the position is 
advanced by the last person on earth, it stands as a statement of what all 
humans possess.  This social and contextual basis for rights precedes the 
formation of collective arrangements and does not imply that rights may 
only arise from communal recognition and award.  Rights discourse may 
well have found itself branded as atomistic, and as a perpetuator of selfish 
individualism, but this is not a necessary result of its emergence.  Rather 
this is the outcome of the balance of political and legal forces amassing 
around rights arguments in the public sphere, and indicates which 
hegemonic positions can dominate public discourse.  Those who retain a 
belief in a vision of human rights that can still transform global, national, 
and regional orders simply lose the argument. 
Human rights are species claims for humans, anchored in how we should 
regard each other and what we owe to each other.  This is the premise from 
which all else flows.  Possessive individualism may be one consequence of 
the rights culture we have inherited, but that need not be the case.  Human 
rights discourse can still rescue its potential by contextualizing the debate 
and placing it in perspective.  The argument advanced here locates human 
rights in perspective not to bury them under a stultifying and relativist 
critique, but precisely because of the disruptive potential.  It flows from a 
desire to keep the law of humanity open to humanity in a way that 
expresses discomfort with those who would insist on closure and the end of 
the conversation. 
One consequence is that many struggles are now internalized within legal 
discourse.  What may to observers appear as dry and technical legal 
argument is frequently very public contestation absorbed into the language 
and practice of law.  Who then wins these legal arguments, and on what 
basis, really does matter profoundly, and that is why we now turn to the 
selected themes. 
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II.  RIGHTS IN PERSPECTIVE 
The aim in this part is to draw out tensions and place the arguments in 
perspective.  The intention is also to promote further discussion.  I include 
reference to what an in perspective view of these subjects might entail. 
A.  Refugees 
The story of those who flee human rights abuses, and thus seek refuge 
elsewhere, echoes down human history.  The treatment of the “stranger” 
raises many questions which flow to the heart of human rights.  Why?  
Because here we have the human being at its most vulnerable, when the 
basis for seeking assistance is the very humanity on which so many fine 
legal and political words have been spoken and written.  To talk of human 
rights is by necessity to acknowledge that status, including citizenship, 
should be morally irrelevant to the treatment of human persons.  In practice, 
however, we know that is not the case.  In fact, status seems to matter more 
than ever.  The emergence of a state-based international global order has 
brought with it both the enhanced capacity of individuals to move (because 
of the technological, political, economic, and social advances that 
modernity brings) as well as the ability of states to regulate entry, residence, 
and removal.  Although the death of sovereignty is often heralded, it 
appears alive and well in the desire of states to decide who will enter and 
belong.  This instrumentalism is reflected in the decisions states take on 
entry, for example.  They will often ensure ease of movement for those who 
bring knowledge, skills, finance, and other advantages.  Those deemed less 
desirable find the right to freedom of movement absent or severely 
restricted. 
Refugees pose an intriguing dilemma.  Conflict appears an enduring part 
of the narrative of our species.  One consequence is displacement, and 
history tells us that this has been the case from the start of our story.  But 
what is the instrumental value to be derived from permitting entry in these 
contexts?  Refugees may well bring with them talent and skill, but not 
necessarily so.  They will often present as other human beings in need of 
protection and assistance.  Whether from a humanitarianism embedded 
somewhere in us, or because refugee movements are problems requiring 
practical management, the humanitarian institution of protection has 
emerged (attaching to refugee status, asylum, displaced persons, and other 
forms of humanitarian status).  These are now reflected in legal instruments 
at all relevant levels.  So, in addition to the generalized guarantees provided 
by human rights law, refugees and asylum seekers “enjoy” protections from 
specialized regimes.  These protections apply both to those who seek safety 
externally and internally, but the applicable systems differ. 
What might it mean to place this discussion in perspective?  We could 
just mean the perspective of a particular participant.  Viewed from the 
perspective of the state, the first conclusion is to draw out and recognize the 
competing tensions in play.  In a world still largely modeled on state-based 
formations—which are attempting to function in a globalized order with a 
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citizen-state model—the disruptive potential of mass movement is obvious.  
Here, state systems are presented with the everyday problems of 
governance and management of human life (in the context of an at times 
skeptical national electorate).  From the perspective of the refugee, 
bureaucratic dilemmas are less pressing than the urgency of protection.  In a 
world awash with the language of human rights, one would be forgiven for 
thinking that practice might match the warm and welcoming rhetoric.  The 
tensions play out in debates on who is entitled to state-based protection, and 
on the creative ways states have of attempting to discourage arrival.  Legal 
systems are implicated in how this overall system is managed, how people 
are treated within it, and in deciding who is entitled to claim protection.  
Understanding participant perspectives is vital, but it is not the totality of 
what it means to view human rights law in perspective. 
Human rights law in perspective brings the following to the discussion of 
refugees.  First, it brings the idea that we are dealing with human beings.  
The point may seem banal but is significant.  We are not talking about the 
regulation of agricultural produce; human persons seek refuge from 
persecution.  To accept the logic of human rights, in all its relational 
complexity, is to acknowledge that we should not lose sight of this basic 
fact.  Second, such a mode of engagement would suggest we remain 
focused on the humanity of the person, not the hierarchies and legal 
typologies that states create for the purpose of selection.  Such an approach 
would suggest discomfort with the idea that hierarchies of protection can 
easily be justified, or that we begin to reconstruct notions of the deserving 
and undeserving in contexts where serious human rights abuse is in play.  
Third, it would mean that the physical location of the person is of less 
importance than the fact of harm.  The human plight of the internally 
displaced person therefore becomes just as pressing.  An in perspective 
approach would view this in context and with all the real world 
complexities.  What it would not do is abandon the idea of humanity as the 
way to always “experience the person.”  It injects into the refugee law 
conversation a tension that can assist in avoiding closure, often on a harsh 
basis. 
B.  Socioeconomic Rights 
The argument that the main lines of the doctrinal debate on 
socioeconomic rights are settled confronts domestic hostility.  The 
normativity of rights, which many people regard as intrinsic to a fully 
human existence, can be contrasted with the stark reality of inequality and 
continuing institutional debates about responsibility.  The plea from the 
human rights movement to acknowledge the indivisibility of all rights faces 
the practice of continued “second-class treatment.”  There are still those, 
however wrong they are in doctrinal terms, who see these not as “rights” in 
a meaningful sense, and/or believe there are distinct and weakened 
institutional implications.  Attempts to persuade skeptics that all rights often 
have resource implications are still frequently resisted. 
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What might an in perspective analysis imply?  First, it means firmly 
insisting on the starting point of the human rights movement:  there is no 
easy way to detach categories of rights.  Separate but equal is not a 
defensible way forward.  Second, it would therefore promote a skeptical 
view of arguments that create hierarchies of significance.  For example, 
how persuasive is the notion that rights can be neatly packaged into 
generations?  Third, it brings cold recognition of global realities and 
national arrangements, not for the purpose of lessening our priorities, but to 
alert us to the sober reality of the scale of the challenge in a world of 
profound socioeconomic inequality and national diversity.  Finally, this 
approach should help us to imagine sophisticated ways to realize the goals 
of human rights in regionally and nationally diverse contexts. 
C.  National Human Rights Institutions 
There has been a steady proliferation of national human rights 
institutions.  These institutions can vary widely in terms of resources, remit, 
composition, modes of operation, and effectiveness.  Their creation, 
however, reflects the view that traditional national institutions for the 
protection and promotion of human rights are inadequate.  Whatever the 
precise motivations in each case, the establishment of a national human 
rights institution implies that the executive, legislature, judiciary, and 
existing civil society mechanisms are not in themselves enough.  Like any 
national institution, human rights commissions can be effective or 
ineffective, some can simply be for international presentational purposes, 
and some are determined defenders of human rights. 
What might an in perspective view add?  First, it implies that a national 
human rights institution is part of a global conversation about rights.  This 
is practically expressed through various international networks, but even if 
these networks never existed, the approach suggests that these bodies 
should be in dialogue internationally.  They are of necessity part of a global 
dialogue that must stretch beyond borders.  This also means that whatever 
their nationalized remit, they cannot and should not confine themselves to 
the purely local.  Second, it brings tools of analysis that look at how 
institutions like this can be effective, and is willing to draw on comparative 
experience from bodies that do not work expressly on human rights.  If 
there are lessons to be learned from other institutions, perhaps grappling 
with very different problems, they should be learned.  Third, it means being 
clear about what the precise role of a national institution should be, and the 
reasons for creating one. 
D.  Bills of Rights 
The national significance attached to rights is frequently reflected in the 
idea that there should be a “bill of rights.”  This is the notion that 
fundamental rights are of such value and importance that they should be 
enshrined in a “sacred text.”  Bills of rights can therefore emerge in national 
contexts as part of a process of national self-expression and self-
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determination.  Classic liberal accounts of the rise of constitutional 
democracy accord a prominent place to the rights of the person as one part 
of the express purpose of democratic government.  Government is there to 
respect and uphold the rights proclaimed, with necessary implications if it 
fails to do so.  Bills of rights (however inclusively drawn the language is) 
are tied very often to a discourse of national self-perception and state 
formation.  This comes close to intertwining bills of rights exclusively with 
a discourse of citizenship, nationalism, and belonging.  The cosmopolitan 
global human rights movement therefore faces a national discourse of rights 
that can be determined in its assertion of national heritage.  The practice is, 
however, that even those bills of rights allied closely to moments of 
national renewal often reflect commitments that go beyond the citizen; 
many bills of rights embrace the person.  In a global order of rights it is 
hard to seal off the conversation.  This is not to deny that a national 
institution, such as a supreme court, may attempt to do so.  National human 
rights protectionism may be one response to globalization and potential 
convergence, but it does not seem the right one. 
What can an in perspective account offer here?  First, and again, it brings 
the national conversation about rights into a global dialogue on the 
treatment of human beings as a species.  Where there is any recognition at 
all of the humanity of rights, then the door is ajar waiting for that dialogue 
to happen.  Second, it helps to avoid viewing rights in purely vertical terms, 
as the imposition of a superior global view over narrow national 
perspectives.  The analysis suggested here would permit a more pluralistic 
and horizontal dialogue that recognizes that the better argument may come 
“from below,” and from a range of institutions.  In perspective again means 
we are not binding ourselves to the deference that flows from hierarchies, 
but subjecting ourselves to the possibility that the best arguments might be 
found in unusual places.  This also helps to nudge the debate beyond the 
“executive, legislature, judiciary” frame of analysis in order to underline 
that any constitutional dialogue on rights must transcend the confines of the 
separation of powers doctrine.  Third, this approach permits more attention 
to comparative method and practice and encourages “looking across” 
national jurisdictions and traditions. 
CONCLUSION 
The intention of this essay is to provoke questions about what a 
conception of human rights law in perspective might resemble.  The 
skepticism voiced here is tied to any attempt to promote political and legal 
closure, and thus support a static model of rights.  What does this mean?  
What it does not mean is that we should relativize rights to the point of 
irrelevancy.  Human rights exist, they matter, and should be practically and 
effectively realized.  What it does mean is that the conversation about rights 
should be kept open for the express purpose of ensuring rights discourse 
does not lose the critical bite that its rhetoric promises.  Political and legal 
documents around the world ooze with the normative language of rights.  
However skeptical a view is taken of all this global “rights talk,” the 
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normative footholds exist to realize what we can only assume people 
intend. 
The defiance of closure is temporal, geographical, institutional, and 
methodological.  The historical memories of the moments from which 
rights emerge must not be lost, or inconvenient realities ushered out of the 
historical record.  The dialogue must defy national closure and remain 
connected to a global conversation on rights, but not in hierarchical 
normative terms.  We should, as observers and participants, resist 
institutional and normative closure in the sense that the best arguments 
about the meaning and practice of rights might not be confined to 
hierarchies—judicial, political, or societal.  Just because the Supreme 
Court, the Government, the opposition, or an NGO says it, does not make it 
so.  Such interventions must be viewed as precisely that:  part of the 
contestation at the heart of modern human rights discourse.  The 
intrinsically disruptive nature of such an approach seems to be the only way 
to respect a dynamic law of humanity, however ultimately derived, and the 
idea that as human beings we owe each other the recognition of what it 
means to live a fully human life. 
Let me end on a deliberately provocative note.  We live in a world where 
human rights law has become institutionalized, legitimized, and absorbed 
into the respectable language and practice of the new global order.  If the 
creation of a global architecture of rights is really a cunning deception, in 
the sense that there is no genuine intention of realizing them, then 
politicians, lawyers, and others should abandon this project now.  Think of 
how as a species we might be judged in the future.  How cruel it would be 
to hold up the promise of a world as envisaged in documents like the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights3
 
 if it is nothing but an elaborate 
hoax.  Better to stop all this now than perpetuate such dishonesty to current 
and future generations.  Better not to hold out such a transformational hope 
that will be honored only in neglect, and better to start a different 
conversation.  Human rights law in perspective might challenge us in just 
such radical ways. 
 
 3. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
